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BOOK REVIEW

REALITIES OF RAPE: OF SCIENCE AND POLITICS,
CAUSES AND MEANINGS
Owen D. Jones4
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INTRODUCTION

Rape is bad. Science is good. But is the science of rape good?
Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, the authors of A NaturalHistmy
t Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science,
and Technology; Research Fellow, Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research; BA.,
Amherst College; J.D., Yale Law School. The author acknowledges the generous scholarship support of the Arizona State University College of Law. Please direct correspondence
to owen.jones@asu.edu.
f-f Regents' Professor and Professor of Biology, University of New Mexico in
Albuquerque.
]-j
Instructor in Anthropology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs.
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ofRape: BiologicalBases of Sexual Coercion,' answer yes and no. It is good
to have a science of rape, they argue; but the current science of rape is
inadequately scientific. Thornhill and Palmer consequently offer, as
partial remedy, a biologically based approach that they believe would
both advance our understanding of the phenomenon of rape and aid
our efforts to prevent it.
In December 1999, an advance extract from A NaturalHistory of
Rape appeared in The Sciences, the respected journal of the New York

Academy of Science. 2 The extract sparked a significant and international controversy that began immediately-even before the book %as
published-and extended for many months after the book's expedited production and distribution. 3

Unsurprisingly, given the book's topic and disciplinary perspective, much of the commentary was heated. 4 Surprisingly, many commentators had not even seen a manuscript of the book before
expressing opinions that were-for lack of a better word-vicious.5
1

RANDY THORNHmL & CRAIGT. PAI.tER, A NxnTuP.L HisToRY OF R,,E BioLoGic.%L

BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000).

2 Randy Thomhill & Craig T. Palmer, ltTy MAen Rape, 40 SciE.NcEs 30 (2000).
3 A sampling of this extensive controversy-which ultimately extended to radio, television, newspapers, and magazines-can be accessed by searching die terms "thornhill,"
"palmer," and "rape" in the Ne:ds or AllNews databases of Lexis or Westlaw, respectively,
using date restrictions appropriate to the January 2000 to July 2000 period. For the authors' response to a number of criticisms, see Randy Thornhill & Craig T. Palmer, An
EvolutionaryExplanationofRape, ScRaI's HowARD NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2000 [hereinafter
Thornhill & Palmer, An EvolutionaryExplanationofRape], availableat LEXIS, Nexis Library
Randy Thornhill & Craig T. Palmer, Rape and Evolution:A Reply to Our Critics (2001) (new
preface to THoRN-LL & PALM-ER, supranote 1), available athttp://mitpressmi.edu/thornbill-preface.pfl.
Although the publisher reportedly scheduled the book's first release for April 1, 2000,
it instead released the book sometime in January, folloing media attention. &ee Scott
Sandlin, Rape a Biological Act, ALBuQUERQUE J., Jan. 22, 2000, at Al.
4 See, eg., Jerry A. Coyne, Of Vice and Men, NEv REPvUBuc, Apr. 3, 2000, at 27 (book
review); Barbara Ehrenreich, How "Natural"is Rape?, TiME., Jan. 31, 2000, at 88; Michael
Farris, Study Indirectly Shoals the Evils ofEvolution, W3sH. TMEs, Feb. 1, 2000, at E5 (arguing
that the book demonstrates why schools should not teach evolution); Readers Spzah Their
Minds About ControversialRape Study, D.u.Ls MORNING NE-S, Feb. 9, 2000, at 5C (publish-

ing a sampling of more than two dozen reader letters); Joan Smith, Inconceivable Conclu.
sions, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 12, 2000, at 46; ControversialNew Tcory of Rape in Tm-ts
of Evolution and Nature (NPR Talk of the Nation, Jan. 26, 2000), LEXIS, Nevs ibrary,
Transcripts; Is Rape About Violence orSev? (CNN Talkback Live, Jan. 18, 2000), LEXIS, Nev;3
Library, Transcripts. See also Erica Goode, 111at Pwvoles a Rapist? ScientistsDebatethe Idea of
Evolutionary Drive, Gin. TmRB., Mar. 8, 2000, at 2 (describing controversy); Marina Pisano,
Book Ignites Debate on Rape, S.N AroNIo ExPRnss-NEvs, Feb. 6, 2000, at 1H (same); Megan
Rosenfeld, The Male Animak Two ScientistsEyplain Rape as a NaluralBehaoiarand Cause an
Unnatural Uproar,WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 2000, at Cl (same).
5 The flashpoint of public controversy clearly preceded te publication of the book,
with the media often securing comments from people who simply could not yet have read
it. See, e.g., Pisano, supra note 4, at 1H (describing "torrent of controversy" based on advance excerpts and author interviews, as "most people haven't even read [the book] yet');
Michael Precker, Rap" Violence orSex?, DALuAS MORNING NEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at IC (observ-
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Indeed, many commentators seemed hand-picked for precisely the lucrative voyeurism this characteristic guarantees.
Clearly, both the commentators and the authors shared the common goal of eradicating rape. But similarities, apparently, stopped
there. A thorough review of the commentary reveals that most of the
critics simply hadn't any clue about how biology can influence behavior generally, or what Thornhill and Palmer were trying to say about
6
the effects of biology on rape patterns, specifically.

Now that some of the dust has settled, the question remains: Does
A Natural History of Rape offer anything useful to legal thinkers? The
short answer is yes. However, the nature of the subject, the subtleties
of behavioral biology, and the form of the book's arguments, when
combined, present an unusual challenge for the reader who would
mine the work for useful information.
This review proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a synopsis of
what this controversial book does and does not say. Parts II and III
survey the book's strengths and weaknesses, respectively. Following
general assessments in Part IV, Part V offers thoughts on the potential
legal implications of the authors' views.
I
SYNOPSIS

Randy Thornhill is a biologist. 7 Craig Palmer is an anthropologist." Both are evolutionists. In this they are in broad and mainstream
company. Both believe that well-accepted principles of evolutionary
ing that the book "has become the hottest controversy in the publishing world, even
though almost nobody has actually read it"); Dan Vergano, "Natural,Biological" Theory of
Rape CreatesInstant Storm, USA TODAYJan. 18, 2000, at 8D. See also Basic Instinct? (Dateline
NBC, Jan. 25, 2000) (describing "a big fight [that) has started before the book is even

out"), LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts. In some cases, commentators were apparently

provided with copies of the book manuscript. Even then, however, finishing the book was
not a prerequisite for adamant public condemnation. Linda Fairstein, for example, acknowledged that she had not finished the manuscript before appearing on the Today
Show. ProsecutorLinda Fairstein and Author Randy Thornhill Discuss His New Book, "A Natural
History of Rape" (NBC Today Show, Jan. 24, 2000), LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts.
6 For a variety of factual and logical errors that commentators often make in evaluating biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression, see Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the
Biology of Rape: TowardExplanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827, 872-95 (1999) [hereinafter Sex, Culture,and the Biology of Rape]. For supplemental observations on public confusion about biobehavioral theories of sexual aggression, see Owen D. Jones, Lazo and the
Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions,11 HASTNNGS WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (2000) [hereinafter
Law and the Biology of Rape]; and Owen D. Jones, Reconsidering Rape, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 21,
2000, at A21. The identified errors surfaced, unfortunately, with all-too-predictable regularity following the publication of A NaturalHistory of Rape
7 B.S., Zoology, Auburn University; M.S. Entomology, Auburn University; Ph.D., Zoology, University of Michigan.
8 BA., University of Colorado at Colorado Springs; MA., Ph.D., Arizona State
University.
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biology provide the foundation for a scientific understanding of behavior, including human behavior. Again, they are in good company. 9 For while there is inevitable interdisciplinary scrabbling over

which discipline (if any) is Queen, there is simply no current and material debate, in relevant scientific communities, about whether evolutionary processes, including natural and sexual selection,' 0 have
affected human bodies, brains, and behaviors.
What is debatable, of course, is what specifically those processes
have left the human brain designed to do, and what the implications,
if any, are. And it is in this arena of controversy that the authors have
chosen to tread. At the most basic level, A NaturalHistoy of Rape argues that an evolutionarily informed perspective on rape behavior
and rape trauma will help provide gains in understanding rape that
can translate into gains in preventing it. This is, of course, simply a
specific application of the general principle: More knowledge is better
than less knowledge.
Media coverage repeatedly asserted or implied that Thornhill
and Palmer, in their book, propose an evolutionary perspective on
9 For useful introductions to modem behavioral biology. written for a general audience, see Tntom= H. GoLDsMrrn, THE BIoLOcIc-.L RoOrs OF Hv.UAN NATwn FORGING
LuIKs BEI"r.EN EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (1991); IArTr PIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND
THE EVOLUnON OF HustaN NAruRE (1994); and ROBERT VnicHr, THE MoPA.
ANnMAtz EVOLUTIONARY PsYcHOLocY AND EVER'DAY LIFE (1994).
For accessible textbooks to increase technical familiarity, see JOHN Aiwc,

ANt.L%

APPROACH (6th ed. 1998); DAVID Buss, EvOLLrrO.'
" PSYCHOLOGr. THE NEW ScaENcE OF THE MIND (1999); MAxRTnI D.Ly &
Rco WILSON, SEX,
EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); ScoTr FRtusiAN &JoN C. Hrnno., EvoLLMnOXA'

BEHAVIOm AN EVOLUTIONARY

ANrtsis (1998); DOUGLASJ. FUTUimA, EvoLtrnoN,-% BIOLOGY (2d ed. 1986); Tntion" H.
GoLDs%r
& Wiutj&i F. ZU!MERMAN, BILOm EvoLtmoq, AND Hvn- NAlvTn (2000);
JAMES L GOULD & CAROL GRANT GOULD, SEXUAL SELEcnoN (1989); J.R. KnRns & N.B.
DAvIEs, AN INTRODUCnToN To BEHAVIOURAL EcoLOcy (3d ed. 1993); Mu RIzwD, EvOWL.
"IoN (1993); and ROBERT TRivERs, SocIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
For an introduction to lai-relevant principles of behavioral biology, writtcn specifically for legal thinkers without biology backgrounds, see Part 1: A Primer in Law-Relevant
Evolutionary Biology, in Owen D. Jones, Evolutionan,Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to ChildAbuse 75 N.C. L REv. 1117, 1127-57 (1997), and Timothy H. Goldsmith
& Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Biology and Beluwvior A Brief Overiew and Some Important
Concepts, 39JmulMrmcsJ. 131 (1999).
Those interested in learning more about the utility of behavioral biology in various
legal matters can find a useful bibliography on the "Readings" page of the web site of the
Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL) at http://mwwsealsite.org.
10 Natural selection is the inevitable result of any system combining the following
three elements: (1) heredity, (2) variation; and (3) differential reproduction. Natural selection describes a process by which the proportion of a population bearing heritable ana-

tomical and behavioral traits increases or decreases over successive generations, as a
function of each trait's cumulative effect on the reproductive success of the organisms

bearing it. Sexual selection, often considered a subaspect of natural selection, refers to the
process by which mate choice (who mates with whom) affects differential reproduction in
sexually reproducing species. See supra note 4.
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sexual coercion for the first time." That is incorrect. In fact, a large
body of literature on the biology of sexual coercion already extends
back more than two decades.' 2 Furthermore, both authors (particularly Thornhill) have previously published works exploring the intersection of rape and biology.' 3 In particular, Thornhill has published
11 See, e.g., Lawrence Spohn, Local Biologist Asserts Rape is Innate, ALBUQUERQUE Ttut.,
Jan. 8, 2000, at Al (describing Thornhill and Palmer as having "developed a new theory");
Controversial New Theory of Rape in Terms of Evolution and Nature, supra note 4 (same); J.M.
Lawrence, Scientists Spark Debate with Controversial Rape Theory, BosToN HERALD, Jan. 12,
2000, at 14 (implying same); Basic Instinct?, supra note 5 (implying same).
12 The References section of A NaturalHistory of Rape provides an essential window on
the extent of this literature. SeeTHORNHIL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 21343. For selected
sources on the evolutionary perspective on sexual aggression, see Sex, Culture, and the Biol'
ogy of Rap supra note 6, app. A.
13 For Thornhill's prior work see, in reverse chronological order, Randy Thornhill,
The Biology of Human Rape, 39JuumEnucsJ. 137 (1999) [hereinafter The Biology of Human
Rape]; Randy Thornhill, Rape-Victim Psychological Pain Revisited, in HuMAN NATRE 239
(Laura Betzig ed., 1997) [hereinafter Rape-Victim Psychological Pain]; Nancy Wilmsen
Thornhill, PsychologicalAdaptation to Sexual Coercion in Victims and Offenders, in SEx, POWER,
CONFLICT. EvoLtnoNARY AND FkMINIs PERSPEcnVEs 90 (David M. Buss & Neil M.
Malamuth eds., 1996); Randy Thornhill, Is There PsychologicalAdaptation to Rape?, 16 ANA.
LYSE & KRiTrn 68 (1994); Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Study of Men s
Coercive Sexuality: What Course Should it Take?, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sc. 404 (1992); Randy
Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The EvolutionaryPsychology of Mens Coercive Sexuality,
15 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 363 (1992) (article followed by extensive peer commentary); Randy
Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Coercive Sexuality of Men: Is There PsychologicalAdap.
tation to Rape?, in SEXUAL COERCION 91 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds.,
1991); Nancy Wilmsen Thomhill & Randy Thornhill, An EvolutionaryAnalysis of Psychologio
cal PainFollowing Human (Homo sapiens) Rape: IV. The Effect of the Nature of the Sexual

Assault 105 J.

ConP. PSYCHOL.

243 (1991) [hereinafter The Effect of the Nature of the Sexual

Assault]; Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An EvolutionaryAnalysis ofPsychological Pain FollowingRape: IU. Effects of Force and Violence, 16 AGGRMsSWE BEHAV. 297 (1990)
[hereinafter Effects of Force and Violence]; Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill, An
EvolutionaryAnalysis of PsychologicalPainFollowingRape: II. The Effects of Stranger,Friend, and
Family-Member Offenders, 11 ETHOLOGY & SocioBoLOGy 177 (1990) [hereinafter Effects of
Stranger,Friend, andFamily-Member Offenders]; Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill & Randy Thornhill,
An EvolutionaryAnalysis of PsychologicalPainFollowingRape: L The Effects of Victim's Age and

MaritalStatus, 11 E'HOLOcY

& SOCIOBIOLOGY

155 (1990) [hereinafter Effects of Victim's Age];

Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, The Evolution ofPsychologicalPain,in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 73 (Robert W. Bell &NancyJ. Bell eds., 1989) [hereinafter
The Evolution of PsychologicalPain); Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Human
Rape: The Strengths of the Evolutionary Perspective, in SOCIOaIOLOGY AND PsycliOLOcw 269
(Charles Crawford et al. eds., 1987); Randy Thornhill et al., The Biology of Rape, in RAPE 102
(Sylvana Tomaselli & Roy Porter eds., 1986); Randy Thornhill & Nancy Wilmsen Thornhill, Human Rape: An Evolutionary Analysis, 4 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOIOLOG" 137 (1983); Randy
Thomhill, Rape in Panorpa Scorpionflies and a General Rape H)pothesis, 28 ANIMAL BEIAV. 52
(1980).
For Palmer's work, see Craig T. Palmer et al., Is It Sex Yet? Theoretical and Practical
Implications of the Debate over Rapists'Motives, 39 JuvMrrucsJ. 271 (1999); Craig T. Palmer,
The Use and Abuse of DardnianPsychology: Its Impact on Attempts to Determine the Evolutionary
Basis of Human Rape, 13 ETOLOcw & SOCIOBIOLOGY 289 (1992); Craig T. Palmer, Human
Rape: Adaptation orBy-Product?,28J. SEx Ru-s. 365 (1991); Craig T. Palmer, Is Rape a Cultural
Universal? A Re-Examination of the EthnographicData, 28 ETHNOLOGY 1 (1989); Craig T.
Palmer, Rape in Nonhuman Animal Species: Definitions, Evidence, and Implications, 26 J. Stx
REs. 355 (1989) [hereinafter Rape in Nonhuman Animal Species]; Craig T. Palmer, 7velve
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widely recognized and path-breaking empirical studies on sexual coercion in insects. And there are some existing data on human rape patterns that have allowed preliminary testing of predictions generated
by evolutionarily informed hypotheses.

The two principal evolutionarily informed hypotheses that the authors explore in A NaturalHistory of Rape are: (1) the Adaptation Hypothesis; and (2) the By-Product Hypothesis.
A.

The Adaptation Hypothesis

The adaptation hypothesis contemplates the existence of heritable psychological features specific to rape. Here is the logic. Theoretically, a psychological, information-processing predisposition toward
contingent (environmentally sensitive and context specific) rape behavior could spread to increasing percentages of males in successive
generations of a sexually reproducing species if it were adaptive. Such
a predisposition could spread if, across all males bearing it, it had a
net positive effect on the average male reproductive success in the
environment of evolutionary adaptation. The reasons it would spread
trace to known and patterned effects of natural selection and sexual
selection on the spread of heritable behavioral traits.
Because indiscriminate copulation is more costly, on average, to
females than to males (because males, but not females, can avoid the
costs of internal gestation), natural selection has generally favored
copulation-partner choosiness in females of internally fertilizing species.1 4 (This is because selective females essentially translate their limited number of lifetime reproductive episodes into healthier and
ultimately more reproductive offspring than do females less choosy
about their sexual partners.) Because males, but not females, can increase reproductive success by increasing the number of partners with
whom they copulate, natural selection has generally disfavored an
equivalent choosiness in males about partner quality per copulation.
This means that the different average costs to males and females of
copulating together have yielded, almost certainly, different male and
female psychologies, on average, concerning willingness to copulate
Reasons Why Rape is Not Sexually Motivate& A Sicptical Examination, 25 J. SEx REs. 512
(1988); Craig Tarleton Palmer, Evolutionary Explanations of Rape: Testing Adaptive and
Nonadaptive Hypotheses (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with author).

14 On the subject of this paragraph, see generally sources cited supqra note 9 (proiiding useful background material). Obviously, not all sexually reproducing species gestate
internally. Internal gestation merely illustrates the general phenomenon. For even in
those species that do not gestate internally, the production and nutrition of eggs is generally more energetically costly to females than the production and delivery of sperm is to
males. Between-sex asymmetries in costs create conflicts, which under the relentless scouring of evolutionary processes creates behavioral as)yametries as well.

1392

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1386

indiscriminately. This conclusion is both uncontroversial in biology at
the level of theory, and robust empirically across known species. This
is, in part, because it is so highly improbable that the cumulated economic effects of natural and sexual selection, across the roughly 600
million years of sexual reproduction on this planet, could possibly
have generated male-typical and female-typical psychologies-in any
species-that are identical in all material respects.
Thornhill and Palmer build on these basic principles, consider
them in the context of the human animal, and reason as follows. We
can expect, because of the effects of natural and sexual selection, that
unmated males and females in ancestral (including pre-hominid) environments came into conflict each time a male wanted to copulate
with a female who would not willingly copulate with him. Forced copulation, in such a circumstance, could in effect increase male mate
number, potentially increasing male reproductive success. (This is particularly axiomatic-even taking into account the low probability of
fertilization from a single copulation-if the male has no willing sex
partners.)
As a consequence, it is at least theoretically possible that if an
evolved male predisposition toward contingent rape behavior (that is,
context-sensitive, rather than automatic, probability of sexual aggression) ever arose, it could spread to more and more males in each
ensuing generation. For when the results of rape increased a raping
male's reproductive success even marginally (compared either to not
copulating at all, or to copulating only with willing females), a predisposition increasing the probability of forced copulation would appear
in increasing percentages of males over many generations. Put another way, males in ensuing generations would be increasingly likely
to be descended from males that themselves bore heritable psychological mechanisms prompting conditional switches among mating behaviors. For example: court when the prospects are good, and force
copulations either when the benefits are high (as when willing females
are not forthcoming) or, alternatively, when the costs are low (as
when the likelihood of injury or reprisals is very low). These mating
behaviors, among which males would switch, would obviously exist on
a continuum, with substantial investments in courtship at one end,
rape at the other, and gradations of psychological and physical coerciveness in between.
In addition to considering this male side of the equation, Thornhill and Palmer assess the effects of natural and sexual selection on
females, in a world in which some males resort to forced copulation.
They point out the opposite evolutionary effects on male and female
success, noting that any possible reproductive gain to a raping male
would inevitably have come at the cost to the female victim of female
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mate-choice. This could potentially decrease her lifetime reproductive success, compared to reproductive success she would likely have
obtained had she copulated all her life only with males of her own
choosing. 15 Thus, argue Thornhill and Palmer, if forced copulation
were a significant risk to ancestral females across evolutionary time,
natural selection would have favored a counterstrategy (if it happened
to arise) in females: acute psychological predispositions toward avoiding and resisting forced copulation.' 6 Over generations, increasing
proportions of females would be descended from ancestral females
who happened to have psychological predispositions to avoid and resist rape. To put it another way, if female-chosen males father more

reproductively successful offspring, on average, than do raping males,
then any heritable indifference to rape or the risk of rape would inevitably dwindle toward disappearance in female populations, leaving future generations of females with a strong, specific, and sex-wide
psychological distaste for rape.

15 See The Biology of Human Rape, supranote 13, at 144. It is important to note that
female reproductive success is not measured, biologically, simply by counting the number
of offspring a female has. It necessarily takes into account the relative quality of those
offspring (quality being affected by the father's, as well as the mother's, genetic contributions) and the extent to which higher-quality offspring can increase a female's reproductive success by themselves attracting high-quality mates and producing high-quality
offspring in future generations. The number of other relatives, discounted by their var~ing
degrees of consanguinity, are included in the "inclusive fitness" measurement by which
reproductive success is defined. For more on the calculation of inclusive fitness, see
sources cited supra note 9.
16 The general idea is that "human mental pain is an adaptation that is designed to
guide cognition, feelings, and behavior tosard solutions to personal social problems that
reduced inclusive fitness in human evolutionary history, and to provide inferences for
avoiding such problems later in life." Rape-Victim PgchiologicalPain, supra note 13, at 239.
The hypothesis that psychological pain is an adaptation
views the evolutionary significance of mental pain as analogous to the evolutionary importance of physical pain. Ph)sical pain serves to draw an individual's attention to some aspect of anatomy that needs tending and can be
fixed by the individual's attention. Mental pain seems to focus an individual's attention on the significant social events surrounding the pain and
promotes correction of the events causing the pain and avoidance of these
events in the future.... The hypothesis of psychological pain makes the
following two generalpredictions about the kinds of environmental information that will result in psychological pain: First, it predicts that the pro.dmate ecological causes of mental pain will be circumstances that affected
inclusive fitness of individuals under social competition. Second, the hypothesis predicts that the more an event potentially or actually negatively

affects the evolved social tendencies, desires, and aspirations

of humans,

the more psychological pain will occur surrounding the event.
Effects of Victim's Age supra note 13, at 158-59.
For more on this subject, see The Effect of the Nature of the Sexual Assault, supranote 13;
Effects ofForce and Violence, supra note 13; Effects of Stranger,Friend,and FamiklMemberOffenders, supra note 13; and The Evolution of PodiologicalPain,supra note 13.
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B. The By-Product Hypothesis
In contrast to the adaptation hypothesis, the by-product hypothesis of evolutionary influences on rape patterns contemplates a process
by which natural selection could affect patterns of forced copulation
more indirectly. According to this hypothesis, rape may persist within
a species not because forced copulation was itself specifically adaptive,
but rather because forced copulation was a by-product of adaptations
to other behavior. For instance, if the relentless pursuit of possible sex
partners increases male reproductive success, on average, and if that
pursuit occasionally results in nonconsensual sex, then populationwide patterns in rape behavior could be a by-product of an evolved

psychological predisposition to pursue possible sex partners eagerly
and persistently. Importantly, the female psychological aversion to
rape could be a rape-specific adaptation regardless of whether the biobehavioral influences on males reflect adaptation or by-product.
C.

Some Predictions

The adaptation and by-product hypotheses generate many similar
predictions, as the authors readily recognize. (In fact, the authors disagree about which, in the end, is more likely. 17) Hypotheses are
tested, of course, by comparing evidence with predictions. And at the
moment (due in part to obvious limitations of human experimentation), the overlap in predictions between the two hypotheses affords
little empirical reason to favor one over the other. Indeed, it is possible that the two causal pathways described above could operate both
independently and in concert. Nevertheless, the specificity and number of the predictions have enabled some evidentiary probing of the
extent to which biobehavioral influences-whether through adaptations or by-products-may affect patterns of rape. If either of the two
hypotheses summarized above accurately describes a process by which
species-typical male and female brains differ-in their processing of
encounters when forced copulations might occur-then the predictions below (accompanied by a brief explanation for the prediction)

follow.' 8
See, e.g., THORNHiLL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 61.
18 I have attempted to render these selected predictions easily accessible to a legal
audience. I hasten to add that because these do not mirror Thornhill and Palmer's presen17

tation verbatim, any shortcomings the language may reflect are my own, not the authors'.
Other useful sources that consider the predictions of evolutionary hypotheses about

sexual aggression, sometimes in more technical detail than this book for a popular audience could reasonably accommodate, include the works of Thornhill and Palmer, cited
supra note 13; Lee Ellis & Anthony Walsh, Gene-BasedEvolutionary Theories in Criminology, 35
CRIMINOLOGY 229 (1997); and Neil M. Malamuth, An Evolutionary-BasedModel Integrating
Research on the Characteristicsof Sexually Coercive Men, in 1 ADvANcEs INPSYCHOLOGICAL ScI-
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First, females (particularly in internally gestating species) wsill be
choosier than males about copulation partners-avoiding and re-

sisting copulation with males they have not affirmatively selected. The
rationale for this is that the cost of random copulation is greater to
females than it is to males. Natural and sexual selection would favor
predispositions, in females, to choose mates and to resist rape.
Second, it is unlikely that rape behavior is confined to the human

species. The rationale for this is that if a predisposition toward increasingly persistent, even aggressive, sexuality ever arose, and if it afforded males bearing it even a small reproductive advantage over less
persistent males, then that predisposition would spread widely
throughout subsequent populations. While such a predisposition can
spread only under ecological conditions enabling it to contribute to
male reproductive success, it is unlikely that such ecological conditions occur only in humans.
Third, rape ill rarely result either in fatal harm, or in harm sufficient to preclude conception and birth. The rationale for this is that
natural selection would have disfavored rape if the costs routinely exceeded the benefits.
Fourth, the biobehavioral hypotheses predict that rape will be
overwhelmingly a male, rather than female, behavior. The rationale
for this is that a male's reproductive success, far more than a female's,
can be increased by increasing the number of partners ith whom he
copulates. Natural selection would therefore favor coercive sexuality
by males more than it would favor coercive sexuality by females.
Fifth, the likelihood of rape, by a given male, will be context specific and will vary with environmental contingencies in a way that reflects the relative benefits of alternative mating behaviors. The
rationale for this is that evolutionary processes rarely favor indiscriminate behavior. In contrast, selection processes could favor a contextspecific predisposition, if it arose, that increased the likelihood of aggression as the likelihood of willing copulation decreased. 19
Sixth, the ages of victims of attempted and completed rape will be
overwhelmingly concentrated into the part of the female lifespan that
is reproductive. The rationale for this is that copulation with females
outside the age range historically bounded by puberty and menoSoCIAL, PERSONml, ANm DEVELoP.MNTAAL AspEars 151 (John G. Adair et al. eds.,
1998).
19 Individuals have the potential to employ different mating behaviors, sensitive to
environmental circumstances. Or, as Crawford and Galdikas put it, iThe members of some
species exhibit conditional sexual strategies. All individuals carry genes for all strategies;
the particular sexual strategy employed depends on factors such as what the individual's
competitors are doing, resources available to the individual, and die individual's size and
aggressiveness." Charles Crawford &Birut6 LF. Galdikas, Rape in Non.HurnanAnimals." An
ENcE:

Evolutionary Perspecive, 27 CANADIAN PsvHOL. 215, 220 (1986).
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pause is unlikely to result in reproduction. Natural selection would
consequently favor male predispositions to copulate, on average, with
fertile-aged females.
Seventh, the probability that a female sexual assault victim will be
raped penile-vaginally (as opposed to orally, anally, or with digits or
objects) will be higher for females within their reproductive years than
it is for those outside their reproductive years. The rationale for this is
that in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, penile-vaginal assaults of reproductive-aged females were more likely to result in conception than were penile-vaginal assaults of unreproductive females.
Evolutionary processes therefore would have tended to correlate the
kind of sexual aggression with the age of the sexually assaulted victim.
Specifically, it would tend to concentrate penile-vaginal assaults, compared to other kinds of sexual assaults, among those victims most
likely to be reproductive. For this reason, we might expect the percentage of reproductive-aged victims who were raped penile-vaginally
to be higher than the percentage of nonreproductive-aged victims
who were raped penile-vaginally. Put another way, nonreproductiveaged victims are more likely to be sexually assaulted in ways other than
penile-vaginally, compared to victims of reproductive age.
Eighth, the biobehavioral hypotheses also predict (although
somewhat less forcefully) that the trauma of rape victims in the immediate post-rape period will tend to vary with age, being greatest among
females of reproductive age and less, on average, among
prepubescent and post-menopausal victims. The rationale for this is
that the magnitude of the effect of being raped on female reproductive success is greater for fertile-aged females than it is for females
incapable of conceiving and giving birth. Natural selection would
therefore more strongly favor psychological resistance to rape in females of reproductive age.
Ninth, the trauma of reproductive-aged sexual assault victims in
the period immediately following the rape will tend to vary with the
type of sexual assault, with vaginal rape being more traumatic, on average, than anal rape, oral rape, or forced cunnilingus, when these
are not also accompanied by penile-vaginal rape. The rationale for
this is that vaginal rape had greater reproductive consequences for
ancestral females than did other forms of sexual assault. Natural selection would favor psychological aversion to physical compulsion
generally. But it would also more strongly favor psychological aversion to vaginal rape than aversion to, for example, anal or oral rape.
Tenth, a disproportionately high number of rapists will be young,
sexually mature males. The rationale for this is that in their earliest

years of sexual maturity young men have, on average, less ability than
older males to attract willing sex partners (due, in part, to compara-
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tively lesser acquisition of resources and status).2 0 If comparatively
lesser access to willing sex partners increases the probability of sexual
aggression, young males will likely be overrepresented among rapists.
Eleventh, the biobehavioral hypotheses predict that the average
age of women raped during robbery will be lower than the average
age of all robbed women. The rationale for this is that if sexual desire
is often a component in rapes, then the average age of female victims
of rapes committed in conjunction with a robbery should be lower
than the average age of female robbery victims, and skewed toward
the reproductive years.
As it turns out, and as Thornhill and Palmer explain in various
portions of their book, there is evidence from nonhuman and human
species consistent with each of these predictions.2 1 Thornhill and
Palmer clearly recognize that some of the predictions generated by
the evolutionary hypotheses have stronger empirical support than
others. And they also clearly recognize that no single match between
predictions and facts categorically proves either biobehavioral hypothesis. Nonetheless, they also believe that, taken together, the predictions, the data, and the logic of the underlying theory make a
persuasive case that evolutionary processes have affected both male
and female psychologies concerning rape.
Specifically, the authors argue that it is more empirically and theoretically sound to believe that evolved patterns of male sexual desire
often contribute to rape than it is to believe that male sexual desire is
wholly-or even often-irrelevant to rape. The authors subsequently
attempt to foreshadow some of the implications of this. And the implications they tentatively explore cover wide territory, from recommending more nurturing environments for young males to affecting
the debate over chemical castration of rapists, and from suggesting
educational programs for youths to recommending changes in post22
rape counseling and treatment.
Along the way, Thornhill and Palmer argue that the existing social science explanation of rape has five flaws: (1) It makes assumptions about human nature that are incompatible with current
knowledge about evolution; (2) It bases its assertion that rape is not
sexually motivated on arguments that cannot withstand skeptical analysis; (3) Its predictions are not consistent with the cross-cultural data
on human rape; (4) It does not account for rape occurrences in other
See DAVID M. Buss, THE EvoLuTnoIN oF DEsRE (1994); Da~id M. Buss, Sm Differences
in Human Mate Selection Criteria,An Evolutionaty Perspcaive, in SoeiowtoLoL1- ,%ND PsyciOL20

oGv, supra note 13, at 335; David MvL
Buss & David P. Schmitt, Sexual Strategies Theoaq: An
Evolutionary Perspective on Human Mating, 100 PSVCHOL RE%. 204 (1993).
21 Some of this data is also summarized in Se:; Culture, and the BiovZ of Rap, supra
note 6, at 859-71.
22 See THORNHILL & PALNER, supra note 1, at 153-88.
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species; and (5) It rests on several assertions that belong more to
"metaphysics" than to science.23
D.

The Null Set

Given the unusually fast and extensive distribution of information
about this book, and the remarkable amount of misinformation that
has circulated, no synopsis of the authors' views would be complete

without briefly clarifying what the authors never say. Contrary to
ascription, 24 for example, the authors never say, imply, or suggest that
the hypothesized biobehavioral influences on sexual aggression
should either exculpate rapists, or mitigate punishment. In fact,
Thornhill and Palmer explicitly and repeatedly reject that idea, dis-

playing a preference for harsh and targeted penalties 25 For as all
good scientists are aware, and all sensible laypeople should be, one
can never legitimately reason directly from a description to a prescription. Put another way, "is" does not imply "ought," and a proffered
explanation should never be assumed to be coextensive with a
6
justification.2
The authors also make clear that they do not believe that men
rape solely for sex. Indeed, they argue that there can be multiple motives for rapes, and even multiple motives at work in an individual
rape.2 7 In addition, they never say rape is inevitable. In fact, they
argue just the opposite. 28 And they never say men who rape have succumbed to uncontrollable or genetically determined urges. Again,
they say the opposite.2 9
II
STRENGTHS

A NaturalHistory of Rape has eight principal strengths. Its first and
most important strength is that it reminds us that inaccurate assumpId. at 128-52.
See, e.g., Michael Ellison, The Men Can't Help It, GuARDIAN (London), Jan. 25, 2000,
at 4 (quoting Susan Brownmiller as saying: "[Thornhill and Palmer] will become expert
witnesses, for a fee, as part of the defen[s]e, and that's dangerous. The ones who wil
benefit will be high-profile rapists who can afford to hire them.").
25
See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 164-65.
26 To so assume is to commit the well-known "Naturalistic Fallacy" discussed in A Natural History of Rape, Id. at 107-10. The term was apparently coined by G.E. Moore in
PrincipiaEthica. See G.E. MoORE, PmNcnipA ETzc.A 90 (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993).
But the concept traces back to David Hume's 1888 edition of A Treatise of Human Nature.
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (LA. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch
eds., 2d ed. 1978).
27 THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 131.
23
24

28

Id. at 153.

29 See, e.g., id. at 154. For further discussion of what the authors do not say, see
Thornhill & Palmer, An Evolutionary Explanation of Rape, supra note 3.
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tions about the causes of rape are costly to rape prevention efforts. 0
The authors suggest this symmetry: just as there might be costs associated with believing that there are biological influences on rape, if in
fact there are none, there are potential costs to believing that there
are no biological influences, if in fact there are. One example, per-

haps, might involve the distribution and consequences of fear. If it is
indeed true, as evolutionary hypotheses suggest and data appears to
confirm, that rape victims are disproportionately fertile-aged women s3 then continuing to assert that all women are equally at risk of

rape would be not only wrong but irresponsible. For whatever gains
such a position might advance for women as a whole, it would come at
the cost of many older women living in far more palpable and con-

stant fear than their statistical likelihood of victimization requires.
The book's second strength is its unflinching insistence that, in
the end, all theories of behavior (rape or othenvise) must reconcile
both with each other and with empirical reality. That is, if biologists,

psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, and others studying rape
maintain assumptions or conclusions that cannot be logically true at
the same time, that presents an unacceptable circumstance that

should prompt immediate investigation, further theoretical and empirical work, and necessary revision and resolution. Interdisciplinary

work is simply essential to a full and accurate understanding of rape.
Yet at present most rape scholarship (such as that in psychology or

sociology) is largely disciplinarily inbred.
The book's third strength is that its general approach rests on

bedrock. Whether or not the specific hypotheses advanced are true,
they have the distinct advantage-over most social science theories of
behavior-of being informed by knowledge of how evolutionary
processes operate to build brains, and to affect behavior in all living

species.3 2 A great deal of social science literature, including that addressing rape, proceeds either agnostic to, or in ignorance of, but in
See, e.g., THo.irn. & PArMER, supra note 1, at .x.
The mean age of rape victims in most data sets worldwide is twenty-four years old.
Studies consistently show that although women of all ages have been raped, victims of
forced copulation are ovenvhelmingly likely to be in their peak reproductive years, between thirteen and thirt-five. See Sex, Cullure, and the Biobolq of Rape, supra note 6, at 865-67
nn.127-32 (citing relevant sources).
32 Even the biologist critics of Thornhill and Palmer's approach do not question
whether or not there are biological influences on rape. See, e.g., Coyne, supra note 4, at 29
(observing that "[t]he sexual dimension of rape is painfully obvious," and notions to the
contrary "originated not as scientific propositions but as political slogans"); Frans B.M. de
Waal, Survival of the Rapis4 N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2000, at 24 (book review) ("Rape is sexual
violence," and forced copulation "is mechanically impossible in the absence of male genital arousal."). Much of the critique within biological circles centers not on whether biolog'
influences sexual coercion, but on whether rape is an adaptation (the hypothesis preferred
by one of the book's authors) or a by-product of evolved sexual desire and evolved male
aggressiveness (as the book's other author prefers).
30
31
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any event inconsistent with, basic and scientifically robust knowledge
of evolutionary processes. True, no single discipline (including biology) explains all human behavior. Nevertheless, attempting to understand rape without any reference to biological knowledge is like trying
to understand politics uninformed by economics, or trying to understand music uninformed by physics and mathematics. One can assert,
without contradiction, that a discipline that fails to provide all the answers is nonetheless an essential part of any complete answer.
Fourth, the book is valuable for demonstrating the provocative
skepticism that is essential to the search for truth. At a time when it is
heresy to publicly question the forceful assertion that rape has nothing whatsoever to do with the rapist's sexual desire, Thornhill and
Palmer offer refreshing (if often irreverent) skepticism toward orthodox theories of rape causation. This skepticism revitalizes scrutiny of
rape theories and will remain valuable even if, in the end, the biobehavioral theories themselves were to offer no other concrete
improvements.
Fifth, the book neither idly speculates, nor casually asserts that
biology affects sexual aggression. Drawing on a large body of biological literature, the authors offer specific and often persuasive criticisms
of orthodox views, challenging any too-complacent acceptance of popular rape theories. Particularly, the authors convincingly (if not always gracefully) demonstrate the utter implausibility of the view that
rape is never motivated, at least in part, by sexual desire. Relatedly,
they report and discuss the overwhelming evidence that rape is not
solely learned behavior, not solely caused by a desire to be either violent, powerful, or humiliating, and not solely a product of sex role socialization. These views have simply been more often asserted than
scientifically demonstrated.
Sixth, the book usefully urges us to separate, conceptually, the
motives for rape from the tactics used to achieve rape. These two distinct elements are often jumbled together in discussions of why men
rape. For example, scholars and other commentators frequently presume that one can discern the causes of rape (the motives of the attacker) from the effects of rape on the victim. 33 The authors remind us
of this simple and unassailable logic: actual effects need not be intended effects. Thus, for example, the inherent violence of rape
might sometimes be a means for achieving an end that is sought, in
part, as a function of sexual desire-rather than as an end in itself, as
is so often assumed.

33 To so presume is to commit what I have elsewhere called "The Error of the Causal
Correlate." Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 880-82.
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Seventh, the book properly dismisses, with finality, the prevailing
but odd conceit that only humans force copulation.34 It has long

been unequivocally clear, in biological circles, that the basic human
patterns of rape are in no way categorically unique, despite some obvious opportunities humans have to vary the specifics of rape in wa)s
other species cannot.3 5 By arguing that cross-species studies of sexual
aggression may increase our understanding of human aggression, the
authors have helped at least to point out, if not yet necessarily open, a
new source of potentially useful insights.
Finally, the book represents a long overdue call for a more scientific and more empirical approach to rape causation. Any broad review of the rape literature cannot avoid the conclusion that the vast
bulk of rape scholarship is unscientific, in the methodological sense.
In one study, for example, two researchers examined over 1610 studies of sexual coercion published between 1982 and 1992 in over 400
different journals and books, from the fields of psychology, educational psychology, anthropology, and sociology.3 6 The authors found

that "scientific methods are not being applied to the understanding of

34 This wholly incorrect belief is widespread. See, eg., HAR\a'v W
1ucu,
FAMILY ViOL.NC:E 251 (1996) ("No zoologist has ever observed animals raping their female mates in

the wild or in captivity."). And for many of the authors who dutifully repeat it, the error
appears to trace back to Susan Brownmiiller's oversight when she stated that "[nlo zoologist, as far as I know, has ever observed that animals rape in their natural habitat, the wild."
SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAr'sr OUR WILU MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 12 (1975).

See, e.g.,

Linda Robayo, Note, The Glen Ridge Triak NewJersny's Cue to Amend Its Rape Shidd Statute, 19
SrON HALL LEGIS. J. 272, 279 (1994) (citing Brounmiller in support of proposition that
animals have never been observed to rape).
Of course, whether or not the word "rape" should be used in the nonhuman context is
itself a question worthy of attention. For an overview of existing debate on the subject, see
Rape in Nonhuman Animal Speies, supra note 13. For views that "rape" should only be used
in reference to humans, see PHiuP KrrciIER, VAULTrING A-, BmoN: SocionmoLocuD TxlE
Qu~sr FOR HUmAN NATURE 184-90 (1985); Larry Baron, Does Rape Contributeto Reprodutihe
Success? Evaluation ofSociobiologicalVitews of Rape, 8 INT'LJ. WoME.W's STUD. 266 (1985);Julie
Blackman, The Language of Sexual Wolencm. More Than a Matter of Senantirs in VtomxxcE
AcAmNsr 'ONMN: A CRITQUE OF THE SOCIOBIOLOG' OF R PE 115 (Suzanne R. Sunday &
Ethel Tobach eds., 1985); Daniel Q. Estep & Katherine E.M. Bruce, The Concept of Rape in
Non-Humans: A 0itique,29 Ammt. BE-Av. 1272 (1981); Donald F.J. Hilton. Is It Really Rape
or Forced Copulation?, 32 BIOSciENcE 641 (1982); Ruth Hubbard, The Political Nature of
"HumanNature" in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SExUAL DiFFEREC
N 63, 67 (Deborah L
Rhode ed., 1990). For a view that "rape" can refer to forced copulation in both humans
and other animals, see Crawford & Galdikas, supra note 19, at 216-17. In my reading of this
debate, those who elect to use the term "rape" have the advantage. Though for purposes
here, it can suffice to define "rape" as simply a short synonym for forced copulation.
35 See sources cited supra note 12.
36 See Del Thiessen & Robert K. Young, Investigating Sexual Coerdon, Socimv, Mar.!
Apr. 1994, at 60.
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sexual coercion" because, in part, "[hiardly ever is a specific hypothe37
sis tested."
While this conclusion accords with my own experience reading
rape scholarship, it does not imply, of course, that existing rape scholarship is worthless. To the contrary, the literature has helped to bring
the issue of rape to the fore, and has increased public concern, public
spending, and legal reform. Nonetheless, a scientific approach to the
question of why rapists rape would clearly be a welcome complement
to that literature-not only aiding our pragmatic understanding of
rape, but also assisting us in preventing it.
III
WEAKNESSES

Although A NaturalHistory of Rape provides valuable and significant insights into the study of rape, it nonetheless displays (like most
books) a variety of weaknesses. These sort loosely into two categories:
matters of presentation, and matters of argument.
A.

Matters of Presentation

I begin, somewhat atypically for review essays, by addressing the
book's form before its substance. I do so for the simple reason that
behavioral biology is so unfamiliar to so many people that the material's presentation becomes the defacto gatekeeper to understanding
content. Moreover, in this particular case the authors' writing style,
rightly or wrongly, has clearly and greatly affected how this book has
been received, and how persuasive or unpersuasive readers have
found its substance.
It is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that the publisher's decision to bring the book to market many months ahead of schedule
truncated the editorial process, with results for which the authors do
not bear sole responsibility. Nonetheless, I note three general weaknesses in writing and presentation, which have apparently obscured,
for many readers, the substance of the book.
First, and most importantly, the tone can be quite off-putting,
even to sympathetic readers. This is not simply a stylistic matter of
salting talk of rape with technical terms like "ontogenetic" and "phylogenetic."3 8 Instead, several independent elements of tone combine to
offend some readers.
37 Id. at 60, 62; see also LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE 19 (1989) (noting
that, for example, "few explicit tests of hypotheses reflecting a feminist perspective have
been made").
38 THoRNuIm. & PALIER, supra note 1, at 191, 55.

2001]

REALITIES OFRAPE1

1403

There is the matter of touch, for example-or rather the frequent lack of it. Little in the book evidences the authorial delicacy
that many readers (particularly nonscientists) might fairly expect in
the face of such a complex, sensitive, and important topic as rape.
True, the authors quickly affirm their awareness of the tragic nature
of the subject, and one of them (Palmer) was prompted to write on
this subject by the rape and murder of an acquaintance.3 9 Nonetheless, many readers will discern a needlessly consistent starkness to the
discussion. For example, even deep into a discussion about rape in
humans, a biologically uncontroversial concept is expressed in the
most jarring and least human way- "Egg bearers are a limiting resource for the population's sperm bearers."4 0 One searches without
success for language that will aid the reader-at an emotional levelin understanding unpopular and seemingly threatening arguments,
sensitive to the deep ambivalence readers wvill predictably experience
at subjecting rape to scientific scrutiny in the first place.'"
There is also the matter of scientific fervor. Not infrequently, the
text sparkles with a refreshingly unbridled enthusiasm for the methods of science. Enthusiasm is understandable, of course, on its face.
And in an increasingly postmodernist world, given to bouts of factual
relativism, this enthusiasm should be welcomed. Yet readers can be
forgiven the impression that the authors on occasion wave the science
flag just a little too fervently. For example, in one place they suggest
that nonbiological perspectives will often be revealed as absurd
a2
"[o]nce the true meaning of biology is grasped." '

There is also the matter of the authors' inpatience with other
disciplines. Thomhill and Palmer clearly seethe over various claims
about rape that proponents have not just proffered as fact, but declared as nonnegotiable, unassailable, never-to-be-questioned fact.
True, even conscientious rape scholars have sometimes said things
that are patently absurd, taken at face value.4 3 And Thomhill and
Palmer have weathered many inappropriate personal and professional
39

The Origins ofRape with CraigPalner,Ph-D., Washingtonpostcom: Live Online (Feb.

2, 2000, 11:00 EST) (transcript of online discussion with Palmer) (copy on file with

author).
40 THORNHILL & PAiMER, supra note 1, at 162. This is true because eggs are almost
always more energetically costly than sperm, and thus fewer in number. &ee sources cited
supra note 4.
41 Psychologist Margo Wilson suggests, in her Forewordto A NaturalHistoryofRape, that

this ambivalence about subjecting rape to scientific scrutiny is due to the fact that even
thinking about rape arouses anxiety, revulsion, and anger. See Margo Wilson, Foreword to
THORNHmL & PAL.MVER, supra note 1, at ix.
42 THORNHIL. & PALiMER, supra note 1, at 165.
43 For a description of several examples, see Sex, Culture,and the Biology of Rape, supra
note 6, at 880-82. See also THopm'un.
& PAMNtu, supra note 1, at 121-22 (offering one
example involving gross mischaracterizations of evolutionary perspectives on rape).
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attacks, even before this book was published, for simply holding to
their own views. 44 So they should not necessarily be condemned for
their flashes of aggression, not having thrown the first stone. Nevertheless, the relentlessly combative tone leveled at prior social science
approaches to rape undoubtedly alienates many readers to whom a
more conciliatory approach might have appealed-even holding constant the substantive content.
Beside these important matters of tone, the remaining stylistic
weakness is minor, but nonetheless unignorable. The use of the word
"Natural" in the title of a book on rape is simply asking for trouble.
People these days too easily, even if wrongly, assume that natural is
good-in the sense that free-range chicken is supposedly better than
confined chicken. And this assumption was implicit in much of the
public reaction to the book.45 True, "natural history" is a term of art
that alone implies no normative value. One could easily write "A Natural History of Plagues," for instance. And calling phenomena such as
tornadoes or earthquakes or death "natural" is not to call them good.
Nevertheless, the book's prior working title, "Why Men Rape, Why
Women Suffer: Rape, Evolution, and the Social Sciences," was probably a better and more accurate one, less likely to mislead or enflame
the book's readers before they had opened it.
B. Matters of Argument

Having surveyed over 200 articles, radio transcripts, book reviews,
online chat venues, and television interviews responding to the book,
I find it clear that many commentators fervently believe that A Natural
History of Rape must be absolutely riddled with logical and factual
weaknesses. I can see how people, new to this subject, might think
this. But it is simply untrue.
A NaturalHistory of Rape is not, by any means, beyond potentially
constructive criticism. For example, two reviewers have taken issue
with the interpretation of several specific statistical conclusions,
44 For example, in the early 1980s, it took Thornhill three hours to deliver a forty-five
minute, invited lecture on evolutionary perspectives on rape. During this time he was not
only picketed and heckled, but spat on. David Concar, Opinion Inlerview, NEw SciENTsr,
Feb. 19, 2000, at 44 (interviewing Randy Thornhill).
45 See Rosenfeld, supra note 4 (making similar observation). For example, an anonymous reader from Illinois, posting to the Amazon.com readers' reviews of A NaturalHistoy
of Rape, criticized the use of the word "natural" in the title. Posting of anonymous reader
to http://wv.amazon.com (Apr. 1, 2000) (copy on file with author). Rape victim Laura
Hartley, making a similar post to the customer reviews forum of Barnes and Noble's website, took great umbrage at the use of the word "natural," saying, "I have been there, I have
looked into those eyes, and I will tell you, there is nothing natural about it." Posting of
Laura Hartley, lauralea_72@yahoo.com, to http://wwv.bamesandnoble.com (Jan. 31,
2000) (copy on file with author).
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among the many dozens that appear. 46 Time will tell if they are right.
For science proceeds by such criticism, as scholars attempt to resolve
their differences in ways that ultimately, sometimes through fits and
starts, advance knowledge. In any work of this magnitude, it is possible, or even likely, that some of the many specific conclusions or conjectures of probability will prove enduring, while others will be proved
wrong.
But they will not be proved wrong on the bases that most people
apparently think. To be fair to the critics, the biology of behavior is
not something one can grasp knowledgeably with only a casual acquaintance with the topic, a popular book or two, or even these authors' necessarily abbreviated introduction to the subject.
Nevertheless, many commentators who rushed to condemn the book
demonstrate reasoning that is either factually flawed (as when they
misconstrue what the authors have claimed) or logically bankrupt (as
when they assume that the actual effects of rape are necessarily the
intended effects of rape). I have elsewhere, and at length, identified
47
and discussed fourteen major errors in fact and logic in this regard.
Suffice it to say, here, that a great deal of published criticism is
inapposite.
Yet while the book is far less vulnerable to criticism than critics
tend to think, the book's argument nonetheless displays a variety of
weaknesses. For instance, it is likely that most readers would have
profited from additional explanation as to why other evolutionarily
informed hypotheses, relating to mutation-selection balance, genetic
drift, evolutionarily novel environments, and evolved male predispositions to control, are rejected in favor of either the by-product or adaptation hypotheses. 48 There are reasons. But most readers will need
46 See Coyne, supra note 4, at 27 (contending that the data supporting predictions
about victim psychological trauma are best collated and analyzed differently, and that, so
reinterpreted, they lend less or no support to certain claims); Michael Seto, Book Review,
60 ANIAL BEHAv. 705, 705 (2000) (reviewing A NaturalHistoy of Rape. BiologicalBams of
Sexual Coercionand contending that data supporting prediction that rapists are disproportionately of lower socioeconomic status were incorrectly interpreted).
47
See Sex, Culture; and the Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 872-95. &z also Owen D.
Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis in Law: Some Objections Considered,67 Broom. L RE%,. (forthcoming fall 2001) (offering additional observations). These include, for example, The Argument from Modem laladaptiveness, The Argument from Incomplete Explanation, The
Argument from Inconceivable Conception, The Error of the Failed Fomicators, The Argument from Substitute Sex, and The Error of the Manifest Motive. &,-Sex, Culture, and the
Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 872-95. Lest there be any mistake on this point, I am not
suggesting that such errors flow only from nonscientists. Coyne, for ex%:ample, who is (like
Thornhill) an evolutionary biologist, displayed the first four of the six errors just mentioned in his own critique of A NaturalHistory of Rape. See Letter froraJohn Tooby & Leda
Cosmides, Center for Evolutionary Psychology, University of California, Santa Barban, to
Letters Editor, The New Republic (Apr. 3, 2000) (copy on file vith author), available at
http://wwwv.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/tnr.htnml.
48 See THoRNHILL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 56-59.
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further assistance to understand them fully. And while the authors
admit some disagreement over the comparative merits of the by-product and adaptation hypotheses, here, too, further explanation and discussion of the implications would have strengthened and enriched the
overall argument.
The authors might also usefully have put greater emphasis on the
bimodalism of rapist demographics. There is primary emphasis, in
the book, on the economically and physically disenfranchised male,
for whom the costs of not raping are (in the reproductive sense)
high,4 9 as a function of being comparatively undesirable and having
fewer opportunities for willing sex partners. But when the costs of
raping are low, as when a rapist is a particularly politically powerful or
otherwise desirable male, who may have either more than average
ability to deter prosecution, or whose comparative successfulness
might result either in a lesser probability of reported rape or a lesser
probability of conviction, rapes may also ensue. Although the authors

acknowledge this as a potential explanation for high-status rapists and

rapes by males with access to a large number of consenting partners,
the book devotes less time than seems necessary to discussing these
variations.5 0
The authors also afford insufficient credit, in my view, to rape
scholarship that preceded them. True, a great deal of the scholarship
provides nothing helpful when measured by its contribution to understanding rape causation. But a great deal of the literature provides an
independently valuable tour of the meaning of rape to rape victims
and the implications of rape to society.5 ' The deserved attention rape
garners today may not have arisen absent some of the feminist scholarship the authors frequently deride.
See, e.g, id. at 67-70.
See id. at 69-70.
51 See, e.g., BROWNMILLER, supra note 34; SUSAN EsTRI H, REAL RAPE (1987); DIANA
E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICrIM's PERSPECTIVE (1975); Susan Griffin,
Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMiPARTS, Sept. 1971, at 26. For useful overviews of how feminist perspectives on rape have influenced modem thinking, see JULIE A. AIsoN & L%,w.
RENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME iX (1993); GREGORv M.
MATOEsAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM (1993);
49

50

NANCY A. MATrHEWS, CONFRONTING RAPE: THE FEMINIST ANTI-RAPE MOVFAIENT AND TIlE

STATE (John Urry ed., 1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1939) (discussing
weaknesses of law's earlier approaches); STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THiE CutLTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAw (1998); DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Perspectives on Gender, vol. 3, Kay Deaux et al. eds., 1990); COLEN A.
WARD, ATTITUDES TowARD RAPE: FEMINIST AND SocLd., PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPEcVES (1995);

Patricia L.N. Donat & John D'Emilio, A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault: HistoricalFoundations and Change, 48J. Soc. IssuES 9 (1992); Mary Ann Lirgen, The
Anti-Rape Movement: Past and Present, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK
(Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1985); Vicki McNickle Rose, Rape as a SocialProblem: A Byproduct
of the Feminist Movement, 25 Soc. PROBS. 75 (1977); Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal
History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 Lw & Soc. INQUIRY 941 (1995).
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The book also tends to ignore the wide variety of perspectives
that coexist (if sometimes uneasily) under the academic feminist umbrella.5 2 While anyone familiar with that literature can be forgiven
some confusion about how to characterize and address it accurately,
the authors provide little evidence of any patient effort to distinguish
among views that run the gamut all the way from helpfully provocative

to truly kooky. Relatedly, A NaturalHistoiy of Rape also tends, at times,
to overestimate the extent to which the academic feminist perspectives on rape are representative of all relevant social science perspectives on rape.5 3 For example, the authors explicitly relabel "the
feminist psychosocial analysis" as "the social science explanation."5
The book also seems, on occasion, to take on too much-often
throwing multiple-paragraph jabs at, for example, post-modernism or
Stephen Jay Gould.55 Similarly, although the authors provide a useful
primer in evolutionary theory and the evolution of sex differences, 56
the authors sometimes intersperse the material useful to understanding the evolutionarily informed rape theories with seemingly inessential material, such as that on consciousness 5 7 and that on bilateral
symmetry. 58 That material is interesting. But without more detail on
the necessity of these passages to the overall argument about rape,
they sometimes appear digressive and distracting.
52
For example, some feminists argue that rape is not sex. Sce Largen, .spranote 51, at
5 (describing how the "Rape Is Violence, Not Sex" motto characterized a number of feminist efforts). Others are of the view that rape can be sex, at least to the perpetrator, and
therefore is often just" sex to the law. See, eg., CATHARiNE A. McAcFiN.oN., FLstist U,-

MODIFIED: DiscoURsEs ON LiFE ANo Lkw 160 (1987) ("Women and men know men find
rape sexual .... ."); CATHARrNE A. MACKINNON, ToWARD A FmuNsT THEORM
OF THE STATE

180 (1989); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxisn, Method, and tMe
State: Toward FeministJuispruden 8 SiGNs 635 (1983) (discussing different feminist approaches to the subject of rape). "Some see rape as an act of violence, not sexuality, the
threat of which intimidates all women. Others see rape, including its violence, as an expression of male sexuality, the social imperatives of which define all women." Id. at 646 (footnotes omitted). For concise descriptions of the breadth of feminist perspectives, see
HILAIRE BARNETT, SOURCEBOOr, ON FL.tiN'ST JuRISPRUDENCE (1997); ALusoN M. JaGOr.
FFm, msr PoLrrcs AND Huatm NATuRE 3-13 (1983); WRD, supra note 51, at 18-37; and
Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Sdwlarship on Rape: A MaturingLooh at One Form of Ioence
Against Women, 2 W. & MRwJ. Wo.Imq & L 35, 45 (1995). On the development of
feminist perspectives generally, seeJOSEPHINE Doxow, FF-nINtsT TEOny (1985);JUDmr
GRANT, Fur
,m-_rAr.FFmrNs.tm (1993); and ROSE.IlE TONG, FF-MINisT THouTrr (1989).
53 See THoRNHrI
& PALNER, supra note 1, at 24, 122.
54

Id. at 123.

55 See i. at 115-17. The best expos6 of Gould's sorties into discussions of human
behavioral biology remainsJohn Alcock's commentary, entitled UnpunduatedEquilibriumin
the Natural History Essays ofSteplenJay Gould, 19 EvoLtrnON AND Hums. BEnt,. 321 (1998),
followed closely by DANiE.L C. DENNErT, DAR% IN's DANGRous IDa. EvoLMnox AND TnE
IEANRGS OF LiFE 262-312 (1995).
56
-57

See THORSmiLL & PALMiER, supranote 1, chs. 1-2.
See id. at 29-30.

58

See id. at 48-50.
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While the authors have also ambitiously undertaken two different
tasks at once, one is left with the lingering impression that they may
have ended up doing neither one quite as well as they undoubtedly
hoped. That is, the book seems divided between a quite general argument for why the social sciences should incorporate evolutionary perspectives on human behavior,5 9 on one hand, and a quite specific

argument that rape theorists should incorporate evolutionary perspectives, 60 on the other. These purposes, though related, are not sufficiently integrated to avoid the perception that the authors maintain
multiple goals, which might usefully have been severed.
The authors suggest, at times, that the evolutionary approach is
not only the fastest way to a sound understanding of rape phenomena,
6
but also the only (or perhaps primary) perspective of importance. '
Although I am generally among the more sympathetic to the claim
that evolutionary perspectives can be quite useful, many specific
claims struck me as somewhat overstated. For example, the authors
assert that "[t]he reason the movement to reform rape laws has met
with only limited success is that the reformers are trying to change
attitudes toward rape in the absence of an understanding of the
evolved psychological mechanisms that produce those attitudes."' "
This may indeed be one of the reasons reforms have had little effect on
the incidence of rape. I am inclined to think that it is. But there are
undoubtedly numerous other reasons as well.
The book would also have been strengthened by inclusion of a
more detailed research agenda. The authors do explore, in places,
how further research could test for the existence of hypothetical adaptations specific to rape. However, a more systematic and comprehensive approach would have enriched the entire discussion. Where do
we need more data? How should it be collected? What sorts of studies
could we do to further test the hypotheses the authors advance? The
authors are quite aware that it is extremely difficult to get funding for
human rape studies informed by evolutionary perspectives. And they
have clearly worked as best they can to analyze pre-existing data sets
developed by others, despite the fact that the data in those sets were

often collected or collated in ways rendering them imperfect for testing evolutionary hypotheses. Nonetheless, including a proposed research agenda in the book would have been quite useful. And it
would have gone a long way toward anticipating the frequent criticism
that there is too little data on humans in the book.
59
60
61
62

See id. ch. 5.
See id. chs. 3-4, 6.
See, e.g., id. at 171.
Id. at 156.
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Finally, the book is simply far stronger on theory and data than
on suggested implications. When the book reaches the latter, there is
a palpable sense of stretch-an uncomfortable reaching beyond the
authors' areas of expertise. To be fair to Thornhill and Palmer, sodety has often insisted on dividing labor, such that scientists are supposedly to work to discover truths, while others are to consider and
develop the implications of them. So for current policymakers to fault
scientists, from moral high ground, for insufficiently developed policy
suggestions is no more coherent than it would be for scientists to
smugly fault policymakers for insufficiently scientific social experiments. Nonetheless, because A NaturalHistory of Rape does tread into
discussions of legal implications and educational programs,63 it is perhaps both understandable and unavoidable that the results are not
fully satisfying.
IV

AssEssNiNT: SoiE PRELIMNiARrES
None of these weaknesses, nor all of them combined, outweigh
the book's strengths. Rape is simply too important a phenomenon,
and the fundamental principles of behavioral biology are too robust,
to ignore entirely possible lessons from the authors' approach. But to
put this book in context, I think it is useful to consider a variety of
reasons why many people might prefer to ignore or reject evolutionary perspectives on rape.
First, and at the most general level, political history has left many
people wary of any attempt to invoke human biology beyond strictly
medical contexts. That history weighs heavy, despite the fact that biology prompts no misuse by itself. Second, and more specifically, antifeminists have historically invoked biology to support repressive
policies. 64 And annexation of biology by those with pre-existing politi-

cal agendas could increase tensions, rather than reduce them, and
thereby offset possible gains in reducing the incidence of rape. Third,
exploring the biology of rape behavior might undesirably shift the focus of social and legal concern from the victim to the perpetrator.
This risks de-emphasizing harmfulness and suggesting that the victim
somehow precipitated her attack. Fourth, if rape is "naturalized," women may be presumed the all-too-natural victims of rape. Such a view
might undercut prevention efforts, as people resign themselves (incorrectly) to supposed inevitability. Fifth, the theories of biobehavioral influences on sexual aggression are technical and subtle, neither
See id. at 153-67, 179-83.
During the early years of the women's movement, antifeminist ideology ,asrooted
in "biology, the experience of evolution, and the will of the Creator." Rtiom, supra note
63
64

51, at 14.
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straightforward nor easy. As a consequence, even those persuaded of
their usefulness may be more likely to misunderstand, mis-cite, and
misapply them than to get them right. Sixth, the larger the perceived
sexual component to rape, the harder it may be to encourage society
to focus on underlying systemic problems of male power and dominance. For some people, combating those problems generally may be
a more pressing concern than reducing the incidence of rape, specifically. Seventh, the existence of biobehavioral influences may lead to
claims that rapists are not meaningfully responsible for their behavior.
Such claims are not supported by the biology, but that does not mean
they will not be raised. Finally, excluding discussion of biology, and
emphasizing the violent aspects of rape, has in prior contexts actually
facilitated a number of positive changes in rape law. Substantive
changes include, for example, the elimination of demonstrated nonconsent as an element of the offense. Procedural and evidentiary
changes include, for example, shielding the victim's prior sexual
65
history.
But there are also many reasons that suggest that we should study
biobehavioral influences on sexual aggression if we are serious about
understanding it enough to better prevent it. First, it is increasingly
evident that law is fundamentally about regulating behavior. And all
behavior is a combination of gene-environment interactions, played
through a body and brain shaped by the forces of evolution, about
which biologists know a great deal. A firm grounding in biology is,
therefore, a necessary foundation for and complement to a sophisticated understanding of human behavior. Biobehavioral perspectives
on behaviors like rape, which have proved difficult for law to regulate,
may help to increase law's effectiveness.
Second, because of the well-documented existence of forced copulation in many other species, researchers should explore the possibility of similar origins (in common ancestors or in response to a history
of similar environmental challenges). Such comparative research is
common for other cross-species similarities in anatomy, biochemistry,
or behavior, and the significance and horror of rape suggest that researchers should make no exception here.
Third, forced copulation in many other species parallels, in a
number of precise and important ways, the patterns of forced copulation and resistance to forced copulation in humans. The existence of
similar patterns, beyond the simple existence of forced copulations in

65 On the subjects of this final point, see generally KEITH BURGESS-JAcKsON, RApt: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 67-86 (1996) (providing a sketch of rape law from the Code
of Hammurabi to the present); and CASSIA SPOHN &JuuLI HoRNEv, RAPE Lkw REroast: A
GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACr 41-46 (1992).
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other species, further buttresses the possibility that the behaviors can
be understood in light of uniform evolutionary processes.
Fourth, these patterns, in humans and other species, can be parsimoniously reconciled through the lens of modem behavioral biology,
which offers plausible theoretical foundations that are both mutually
consistent and consistent with other well-recognized theories.
Having previously spent several years studying many of the primary sources on which A NaturalHistory of Rape relies, I find it probable that future gains in preventing rape will require attention to
biobehavioral perspectives. Given the current climate of opinion,
however, significant opposition to such research is likely. What might
assist?
The most significant thing we could do to further our efforts to

reduce the incidence of rape is to fight disciplinary turfism and foster
interdisciplinary cooperation. Practitioners of different rape-relevant
disciplines waste a great deal of precious energy accusing their perceived competitors of oversimplifying, and of missing essential truths
about rape that only their own disciplines are equipped to reveal. Legal policymakers have unwittingly contributed to this adversarial
model by periodically bestowing most-favored-theory status on only
one perspective at a time. 66 This creates a zero-sum game, in which
theorists interested in legal applications perceive the need to knock
another theory out of favor before they can garner attention for their
own theory-and then resist the incursion of other disciplinary perspectives in order to maintain the status of their own.
Behavioral phenomena simply have no respect for the artificial
disciplinary boundaries that universities produce. There is simply no
reason whatsoever to think that rape can be best understood from a
single psychiatric, psychological, feminist, neuroanatomical, evolutionary, or sociological perspective. Progress, if any, will come from
interdisciplinary synthesis. Disciplines like law, more suited to consuming and applying knowledge from other disciplines than to generating knowledge itself, can help to encourage such synthesis.
To facilitate this synthesis we must first recognize-far more explicitly than we now do-that rape scholarship reflects many different
and useful goals. Relatedly, we must be sure that we know, at each
moment, which one (or more) of these goals we are talking about.
This sounds too obvious to mention. But the fact is that the frequent
failure to articulate for others what one's own goal is, and the consequent misattribution by others of what one's goals may be, is a princi66 See Sex, Culture and M1w
Biology of Rap4 supra note 6, at 838-41 (offering a short
history of psychiatric, feminist, and sociological rape theories and their seriatim influence
in law).
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pal reason interdisciplinary (and sometimes intradisciplinary)
discussions of rape often yield more heat than light.
For example, Thornhill and Palmer articulated a goal of increasing the ability to prevent rape by increasing our understanding of
rape causation. I think it is fair to say that they assumed, when confronting a large body of rape literature, that most scholars were principally motivated to pursue that goal as well. This is not necessarily
true. While everyone may share that goal, in the abstract, other
goals-narrower, broader, preliminary, or consequent-may
predominate. Some scholarship focuses on increasing public awareness about the extent of rape in society. Other scholarship seeks to
expand definitions of what constitutes rape. Still other scholarship
may have, as a principal goal, increased reporting by victims, increased female "voice" in public matters, increased public funding for
victim services, increased understanding of rape victim trauma, or reduction of perceived patriarchal oppression in general.
The problem is that making claims about what causes men to
rape can be very effective components of achieving some of these
goals, regardless of the scientific truth of the claims. That many of
such claims are not held to scientific standards of proof does not, for
those who advance them, make such claims unhelpful. But that
claims born of different purposes often cross swords in a waste of misunderstood intention affords us no help at all. Working to see how
different disciplinary pieces can fit together is a more constructive exercise than seeking to displace one with another.
Ultimately, A NaturalHistory of Rape may be most valuable for reminding us of two things. First, if we are serious about reducing the
incidence of rape, we need to get more serious about understanding
its actual causes, which are not necessarily the same as the commonly
asserted causes. Second, causation is fundamentally a scientific
matter.
By any measure, rape is insufficiently understood to be effectively
prevented. The process of increasing our understanding of rape causation consequently requires an organizational overhaul in the way we
think about rape. Specifically, and at the very least, it requires sharply
distinguishing some things that have long been presumptively lumped
together. Below are some specific suggestions.
A.

Distinguishing Among Rapes and Among Sexual Assaults

There is absolutely no reason to assume that rape is a unitary
phenomenon, always traceable to common causes. Just as there can
be a variety of reasons to commit arson (revenge, insurance fraud,
insanity, murder, intimidation), there can be a variety of reasons to
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rape. Moreover, those reasons multiply quickly as we continue to expand the types of activities we consider rape to include.
Once limited to forced insertion of a penis into a vagina, the operative definition of rape has been broadly expanded, often into
super-categories of sexual assault. Depending on context and jurisdiction, it appears that rape can include a variety of possible perpetratorvictim sex combinations, a variety of possible objects or body parts
forcibly inserted, and a variety of different orifices violated. Thus, for
example, there is male-male, male-female, female-male, and femalefemale rape. Victims can be raped not only by penises, but also,
among other things, by objects, tongues, and fingers. The act of rape
may violate vaginas, anuses, mouths, or any combination. The matrix
of possible combinations has become enormous, highlighting the folly
of thinking that rape, as it may be expansively defined, has single or
67
always common causes.
My point here is not a technical one, about whether rape should
be a separate offense or a category of sexual assault. My point is that
we are increasingly coming to view all these various combinations as so
similar that any credible rape theory should explain each of them.
This is silly. To avoid what I call "The Argument from Incomplete
Explanation" 68-which illogically faults an explanation of one kind of
rape for failing to explain all kinds of rape-we should both ensure
that we understand the particular kind of rape being addressed, and
allow for the fact that even accurate, perfectly predicting explanations
for some kinds of rape need not explain all. We have overlumped
sexual assaults together, and we need to subdivide them, at least for
the purposes of studying causation, in order to more efficiently and
narrowly target our legal weaponry against them.
B.

Meanings and Causes; Victims and Perpetrators

One useful and systematic way to divide rape theories is to recognize the distinction between what we might call the realm of meaning
and the realm of cause. I propose this not because meanings and
causes are mutually exclusive, but because even when perspectives on
them overlap, they nonetheless represent fundamentally different
kinds of inquiries. This view is surprisingly absent from rape scholarship. It is both too common and illogical for scholars to assume that
actual effects of rape are intended effects of rape, and that detailing
the social meanings of rape accurately divines the actual motives of
rape. Because correlation is not causation, however, there need be no
67
I elaborate on this point in Law and the Bioogy of Rape, supra note 6, at 166, on
which some portions of what follows draw.
68 Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 892.
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automatic connection between the effect of an act and the reason for
doing it.
Dividing theories of meanings from theories of causes has two
advantages. First, it affords researchers more freedom to pursue the
subject of one domain, unharassed by critics from the other. Second,
it more closely matches the product of different rape scholars with the
aspect of legal process in greatest need of that product. Scholars detailing the social meaning and victim impact of rape can help prompt
public concern about rape and mobilize legal interventions. Scholars
researching the causes of rape can help direct legal interventions in as
many useful ways as possible.
Consider rape and the realm of meaning. Typically, law receives
direction and social goals from the realm of meaning. It is in the
normative and interpretive arena that one answers such questions as:
What does it mean to live in a society in which rape occurs? Is rape a
good thing or a bad thing, and why? How important is it that we act
to prevent rape? Law would be agnostic on the causes of rape, were it
not for the meanings of its effects, and the effects of its meanings.
There are historical, political, social, feminist, and moral dimensions to rape, among others. Each offers important contributions to
public and private understandings and reactions to the phenomenon.
Consequently, it is in the realm of meaning that society perceives,
processes, and assesses the significance of rape and the extent of its
harms.
Next, consider rape and the realm of cause. For some disciplines,
it is sufficient to study only the meanings of rape. Law is not one of
these. Meanings may affect law's goals, but optimally effective paths
toward reaching those goals typically require an accurate understanding of the things that influence the probability of the behavior in
question. Consequently, law must attend as closely to cause as it does
to meaning.
C. Explanations and Justifications
Another conceptual division that needs sharpening is the logical
distinction between explanations and justifications. Too often, critics
have supposed that the effort to explore biological influences on patterns of rape will yield support for rapists fighting conviction.69 There
69 Reportedly, "[s]ome [critics] fear the hypothesis could be used in a sort of'Darwin
made me do it' legal defense for rapists." Martin Miller, Rape, LA. TIMs, Feb. 20, 2000, at

El. See also Not-Yet PublishedBook on Rape Critidzed, FL. TiMEs-UNIoN, Feb. 13, 2000, at A9
(reporting same); Juliet Wittman, Origin of the Specious, DENVER WEsrwoRD, Feb. 10, 2000

(reporting same), available at http://www.westword.com/issues/2000-02-10/feature.lhtml
(last visited July 9, 2001). For example, Gill Mezey, a rape psychologist at London's St.
George's Hospital, is quoted in a separate source as stating that the Thornhill and Palmer
book "appears to provide sexual offenders with a ready-made and very convenient excuse,
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are two glaring problems with this criticism. First, explanation by itself is notjustification. Ever. Explaining a disease, for example, does
not imply that it should exist, or that it should not be eradicated.
Second, assuming too quickly that biological influences yield exculpation often reflects wholly incorrect and misplaced assumptions
of genetic determinism 7 0-as if biology can only influence behavior
by some sort of inevitable genetic preprogramming. No serious biologists, and certainly neither Thornhill nor Palmer, believe such a thing.
D.

Proximate and Ultimate Causes

Another often unnoticed distinction that bears extreme, explicit,
and repeated emphasis is that there are two fundamentally different
kinds of causes: proximate and ultimate.7 1 These causes simply do not
compete on the same plane of analysis, despite the heated arguments
between those who consider biological influences on rape and those
who do not.
Biologically speaking, proximate causes are the immediate
causes, described in terms of, for example, stimuli, organismic physiology, and biochemistry. The perhaps too-grandly-named ultimate
causes are those reflecting the effects of evolutionary processes, operating across long periods of evolutionary time. For example, suppose
you raid the refrigerator because you feel hungry, after a noon-time
interruption made you skip lunch. The biochemical signals sent to
your corporeal brain, which you perceive as hunger, and the noontime interruption itself, are proximate causes of your visit to the
fridge. But the ultimate cause of your visit is that evolutionary
processes operated to favor those acutely calibrated organisms that associate food-seeking behavior with imminent nutritional needs over
less well-calibrated organisms. The former left more offspring than
the latter, the offspring share the trait, and the trait, because of its
very importance, becomes typical of the entire species.
which allows them to escape responsibility for their actions because there is a biological
pre-determinism." Richard Ingham, Rape? It's in Men's Genes, Sal's ControtasialNew Boo.
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 7, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File. A
number of reviewers on the Amazon.com website interpreted die book asjtstif)ing rape.
See, eg., Posting of Dixie from California to http://wwi.amazon.com (Apr. 28, 2000) (copy
on file with author); Posting of Reader from Kirkland to http:// w,.imazon.com (Apr.
28, 2000) (copy of fie with author); see also Ellison, supra note 24 (quoting Susan
Brownmiller).
70
See Sex, Culture, and the Biology ofRap supra note 6, at 877-80 (discussing The Error
of the Damning Determinism").
71 See, ag., John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The Utili)y of the Ptoxirnate-LqinateDicholorny
in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGy 58, 59 (1994) (arguing that the "%ast majority of behavioral hypotheses and questions can be assigned unambiguously to either the proximate or ultimate
category").
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Proximate (immediate) causation can be understood in light of
ultimate (evolutionary and historical) causation. Similarly, the fact
that sex drive is not generally inspired by a conscious desire to create
an offspring in no way undercuts the obvious conclusion that evolutionary process importantly "caused" sex drive because of its effects on
reproductive success. In the context of rape, therefore, proximate
and ultimate causes certainly can coexist without competing with each
72
other, as most commentators seem to think they do.
V
ASSESSMENT: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

If Thornhill and Palmer are correct that both rape patterns and
rape-victim revulsion reflect the influence of evolutionary processes
on the human brain, what legal implications might ensue? In symmetry with the legal readers untrained in biology, Thornhill and Palmer
are not trained in law. Therefore, it is neither surprising nor particularly troubling that A Natural History of Rape offers neither concrete
analysis of existing rape laws, nor specific suggestions for legal thinkers to implement. However, consistent with the authors' efforts to
reach a broad audience, they make some effort to convince legal
thinkers that such analysis may be worth the effort.
First, they underscore the importance of environmental and developmental influences on males to any propensity toward sexual aggression. Thus, the more that legal policies can help to aid research
on how male brains process these factors, and to reduce or diminish
the existence of these factors in our society, the better.
Second, Thornhill and Palmer very much believe in punishment,
as both a general and a specific deterrent. They suggest, in effect, that
increasing the costs of rape will, at least in some cases, help to reduce
its incidence. They believe that males will be at least somewhat sensitive, consciously or not, to the costs of raping behavior.73 As Thornhill and Palmer state: "We do not propose a specific program for
increasing the costs associated with rape; we simply suggest that social
engineers who wish to get realistic about rape pursue a program of
74
punishment that is informed by what is known about evolution."
Third, Thornhill and Palmer suggest that the debate over the legality and wisdom of chemical castration (libido suppression by drug)
should be informed by knowledge of biobehavioral influences on patterns of sexual aggression. 75 Specifically, an informed biological approach can help answer questions concerning the extent to which
72
73
74
75

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 1, at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
See id. at 165-67.
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male sexual desire affects rape, and thus, the extent to which chemical
castration is likely to reduce recidivism.
Fourth, Thornhill and Palmer suggest that knowledge of evolutionary influences on sexual aggression, and acute female revulsion to
forced sex, could help make people generally more aware of the existence and horror of rape2 6 This might, they think, help those arguing for legal reform to be more persuasive, and it might help those in
a position to effect legal reform to be more receptive. Relatedly, they
suggest that getting more women into more legally powerful positions

would represent and foster progress as well. 7
Finally, Thornhill and Palmer suggest that an evolutionarily informed examination of existing rape laws will have several advantages. 78 It may help explain why rape has been punished in the
patterns it has, all over the world. It may help us to understand why
statutory rape prohibitions are written as they are. 79 And it may help
us to recognize and explain-and counteract through greater awrareness-the fact that rape laws have historically focused on protecting
parties other than the victims.8 0
Although these suggestions are somewhat vague and perhaps
overly optimistic, they are nonetheless pointed in precisely the right
direction. The debate over the potential effectiveness and legal permissibility of chemical castration-which has been active for years 8176

77
78
79
80

81

See id. at 154-61.
See ii at 159.
See id. at 154-61.

See id. at 162-64.
See id. at 164.
See William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offend-

ers: Statutory and ConstitutionalIssues, 12 U. DAyroN L RE%,. 1 (1986); Daniel L Icenogle,

Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological Tratmnen 15 J. LrL Mm. 279, 286
(1994);John S. Murray, California'sChemical CastrationLaw: A Modd for Massachusetls?,24
NEv ENG.J. ON C.Me. & CIV. CoN ,TMENr 731 (1998); KarenJ. Rebish, Nipping the Pro!nem
in the Bud:- The Constitutionalityof Calfornias CastrationLaw, 14 N.Y.L Smi. J. Hum. R-rs.
507,516-17 (1998); Larry Helm Spalding, Roridas1997 ChemicalCastrationLaw: A Rturn to
the Dark Ages, 25 FA. ST. U. L REv. 117 (1998); William L Baker, Comment, Castrationof
the Male Sex Offender A Legally Impermissible Alternative, 30 Lo. L RE%,. 377 (1984); Jodi
Berlin, Note, Chemical Castrationof Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the Ann" Tozards Rehabilitation,
19 WNHrrr
L REv. 169 (1997);Jennifer IL Bund, Comment, Did )ou Say ChemicalCastration, 59 U. Prrr. L REv. 157 (1997); Alison G. Carpenter, Comment, Belgium, Germany,
England, Denmark and the United States: The Inplementation of Rrgistrationand CastrationLaus
as ProtectionAgainst HabitualSex Offenders, 16 Dic J. INT'L L 435, 439-41 (1998); Kenneth
B. Fromson, Note, Beyond anEye for an Eye" Castrationas an Alteratie
alSenteningMeastre, 11

N.Y.L. Scn.J. Hum. RTs. 311 (1994); Pamela I. Hicks, Comment, Castrationof Sexual Offenders: egal and Ethical Issues, 14 J. LEcAL MED. 641 (1993); Bryun Keene, Note, Chtanical
Castration: An Analysis of Roida'sNew "Cutting-Edge" Poli, Towards Sex CriminaLs 49 FL%. L
REv. 803 (1997); Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternati'eto Incarceration, 31 DUQ. L REV. 307 (1993); Kari A. Vanderzyl, Comment, Castrationas an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offeners, 15 N. Ii. U. L
RExv. 107 (1994).
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probably serves as the most obvious and concrete application in the
legal context.8 2 Currently, many commentators and legal thinkers
subscribe to this view:
[B]ecause [rapists'] conduct is often motivated by anger and hatred
rather than sexual desire, a treatment that merely curbs sexual desire bears no reasonable relationship to the offender's criminal behavior.... Moreover, because [rapists] are motivated not by sexual
drive, but by intense feelings of hatred and hostility, the procedure
may cause an increase in the occurrences of this type of sexual
83

battery.

First, there is little question that chemical castration reduces male

sex drive. The legally relevant question is whether male sex drive is an

important factor in convicted rapists' recidivism. If it is, chemical castration is more likely to be a useful and constitutionally permissible
condition of parole, for example. Second, if chemical castration is an
aspect of state punishment, it can run afoul of the constitution if it is
either unnecessary or applied arbitrarily.8 4 Again, whether chemical
castration is sufficiently necessary and nonarbitrary depends, in part,
on the extent to which rape is in fact typically influenced by sexual
85
desire.
82 Chemical castration involves regular chemical injections of, for example, medrox.
yprogesterone acetate (commonly known as Depo-Provem). These injections shrink the
testicles, inhibit the release of testosterone and other hormones that affect the brain's
ability to sexually fantasize, and reduce sex drive in men. The effects are thought to be
reversible. See Icenogle, supra note 81, at 286; Rebish, supra note 81, at 516-17. For further
discussion of the relevance of evolutionary analysis to the chemical castration debate, see
JOHN H. BECKSTROM, DARWINIsM APPLIED: EVOLuIONARY PATHS TO SOCIAL GOALS 53-65
(1993); and Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 912-16.
83 Spalding, supranote 81, at 132-33 (footnotes omitted); see also Green, supra note 81,
at 8 (reporting views of other commentators that reducing a rapist's sexual drive will only
result in his exercising deviance in other ways); Bund, supra note 81, at 189 (noting that
chemical castration "does not help violent sexual predators"); Hicks, supra note 81, at 647
(noting that "[m]any experts say that castration will not work because rape is not a crime
about sex, but rather a crime about power and violence").
84
For a discussion (in a different context) of the commonly used constitutional tests

regarding punishments, see Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238, 281-306 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); and Bund, supra note 81 (discussing a number of constitutional challenges to
chemical castration).
85 Of course, there are other values at work here. We are generally hesitant (in a
fashion undoubtedly susceptible of evolutionary analysis) to have our legal system interfere
with procreative liberties. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US, 833, 849, 851
(1992) ("[T]he Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's
most basic decisions about family and parenthood," such as "personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.");
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding state statute impairing access to
contraceptives unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(same); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding state statute requiring
sterilization of certain habitual criminals unconstitutional). And to the extent that chemical castration may do so, we are properly cautioned. Nevertheless, the effects of chemical
castration are apparently reversible. Therefore they likely have, at worst, no more effect on
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An evolutionary analysis might also provide a valuable window

into the legal history of rape law.8 6 There is little doubt that evolu-

tionary analysis of human emotions and behavioral predispositions
may provide a richer understanding of some features of the legal system. 8 7 Rape law is likely one of the most promising examples to pursue. From the evolutionary perspective, the widespread proscription
and harsh penalties for rape were probable. They can be understood
to be, in part, the product of deeply visceral male and female psychologies about reproductive matters. Natural selection likely swept away
any psychological tendencies in female ancestors to be indifferent to
being raped, and similarly swept away any psychological tendencies, in
males and females alike, to be indifferent to daughters, sisters, and
female mates being raped. The legal history of rape and the patterns
of punishments that have unfolded therefore can be illuminated significantly, perhaps even largely explained, by tracing the way evolutionary processes have influenced the psychology of the human brain.
That is, to the extent that our human laws will tend to reflect what
humans care about, evolutionary psychology will enable us to explain,
in part, why certain things were deemed sufficiently important to warrant collective sanctions, and why certain things tend to be encouraged more, or punished more, than others.
Beyond the chemical castration and legal history contexts, there
are possible legal applications that may involve, depending on precisely what values are given voice: (a) the greater contextualization of
victim trauma; (b) a better understanding of whether rape is sufficiently like a hate crime for legislation modeled on hate crimes (such
as the Violence Against Women Act of 199488) to prove useful; (c)
reconsideration of whether the move to classify rape alongside other
sexual assaults is more or less likely to yield an effective deterrent or
punishment; and (d) more focused cost-benefit analyses of some policies (like antiprostitution policies) that may trade, in their successes,
against anti-rape policies. 89
a rapist's future reproduction than does a similar period of incarceration. This makes

chemical castration a more appealing alternative than surgical castration.
86 See Se, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 930-33.
87

See Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Nonns: Biolo&, Moraliy, and the Dismplion of
THE GmrYT DIsnvr oN:

Order, 98 MicH. L REv. 2072 (2000) (revieing FRANcts Fvvu~w,,

HuiAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTrIUION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999)).

88 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, §§ 40001-40703, 103
Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
The Supreme Court recently invalidated the Act's cil remedy provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981, as unconstitutional. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000), aft'g
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
89
Some of these potential legal applications are addressed in Sex, Culture, and the
Biology of Rape, supra note 6, at 909-33. Others are addressed in articles compiled in the
Winter and Spring 1999 special issues ofJurinerids:TheJournalof Law, Sdene, and Tethnv!ogy, following the Colloquium on Biology and Sexual Aggression:Investigating Thaerirs, Data,and
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Are we likely to see successful defenses of accused rapists that
turn on evolutionary biology? I sincerely doubt it. Properly understood, the science is simply not moving in directions that materially
affect any third-party assessment of individual responsibility. True,
every courtroom context risks the possibility that lawyers will intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent the content or significance of
science. And nothing except the rigors of the adversarial system, and

the gatekeeping role of the judge, is stopping a defense attorney from
raising a science-of-rape defense at trial. But the important question
is: will it work? I predict it will not. First, explanation and justification
are severable, and science attends only to the former, as mentioned
earlier.9 0 Second, the evolutionary theories address population-based
probabilities and predictions-and do not address either individual
predictions or individual, post-act explanations. They cannot purport
to explain with particularity why a single individual, in a single circumstance, did what he did. This is not to say that the theories shall never,
categorically, have any role in the courtroom. 91 But it is to say that
neither exculpation nor mitigation should properly be thought to be
one.
CONCLUSION

Nothing truly important is ever simple. And the subject of rape is
clearly no exception. For although we are daily reminded that rape is
about violence, not sex, we are also daily reminded that rape is still
happening, not fully deterred.
Modern reforms of rape law have scored more points for symbolism than for prevention. And the fact is that the multiple causes of
rape remain insufficiently understood for law to deter it effectively.
Ironically, the very slogans used successfully to draw attention to the
problem of rape can, if taken too literally (as they often are), help to
obscure potentially constructive research into the multiple causes of
rape.
Implicationsfor Law, held pursuant to a grant from the National Science Foundation to
OwenJones and Dan Strouse. See Symposium on Biology and SexualAggression, 39JuamumLTRICs

J. 113, 113-226, 233-71 (1999).
90 See supra discussion Part IV.C.
91 Evolutionary theories might be constructively introduced to rebut the lingering
presumption, in some judicial minds, that an otherwise "normal" defendant who raped a
woman must have been either insane or temporarily so. For example, a forensic psychiatrist I know, J. Anderson Thomson, was recently asked by a judge to provide an insanity
evaluation of a rape defendant. Given the circumstances of the case, the explicit statements of the defendant's attorney, the characteristics of the defendant, and the request
from the judge, Thomson believes that the basis for requesting the psychiatric evaluation
was simply the assumption that seemingly normal men only rape if they are insane or at
least temporarily so.
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It is unlikely that we will ever see a study that, by itself, convincingly demonstrates a clear cause of rape behavior. All human rape
data have-and always will have-weaknesses. For one simply cannot
run nicely controlled rape studies in humans (the way one can in
orangutans, for example 92 ) that measure how likely it is that a woman
will be raped in this context rather than that, or by a male exposed to
these environmental factors rather than those. The very nature of the
crime renders it both practically and morally unobservable in the
usual scientific sense. Consequently, this means that evaluating the
plausibility of rape causation theories will likely always be a matter of
assessing probabilities and attempting to triangulate from everything
we know.
Based on what we currently know, there is little doubt that there
is more to understanding rape than biology. But there is equally little
doubt that no purportedly comprehensive understanding of rape can
wholly exclude behavioral biology. Sexual coercion is too widespread
in the animal kingdom, too eerily similar in its patterns, too consistent
with evolutionarily informed predictions, too logically coherent with
everything else we know about behavioral biology, and ultimately too
consistent with human patterns of sexual aggression for the phenomena to be wholly socially constructed.
The strengths of A NaturalHistoy ofRape significantly outweigh its
weaknesses. The central perspective advanced by this book-that biological insights about rape are important to understanding causation
and furthering prevention-is essential to rape scholars and legal
thinkers alike. This will remain true, whether or not the specific hypotheses for biobehavioral influences these authors suggest are exactly right. And this will remain true, even though many people wUill
find parts of the book-and indeed the general subjection of rape to
scientifically rigorous scrutiny-unpersuasive, or even offensive.
Despite the fact that a great deal has been said about rapemuch of it useful-for many, many years little new has been shown.
This book is an important step toward showing us something new.
The fact that new insights may be unpleasant, complicating, incomplete, difficult to follow, potentially misused, or even frightening, is
never sufficient reason to discard them as false.
For this reason, as well as for fidelity to the cause of fighting rape
in the fields and trenches, the evolutionary perspective on sexual ag92 See Ronald D. Nadler, LaboratoryReseardt on Sexual Behaviorof the Great Apes; in RE.
PRODUCTIVE BioLoGY oF TiE GREAT APES: Co!PAATnE AND BIoMFic.I. PERSPECTES 191

(Charles E. Graham ed., 1981); Ronald D. Nadler, SexualAggression in the Great Apis, in 528
ANNa s N.Y. Ac.Aj. Sci. 154 (Robert A. Prentky & Vernon L Quinscy eds., 1988); Ronald D.

Nadler, Sexual Aggression in te GreatApes: hnplizationsforHumnan Law, 39JvrMETErcsJ. 149
(1999); Ronald D. Nadler, Sexual Behaviorof Orangutans(Pongo pygmaeus): Basic and Applied Implications, in THE NEGLECED APE 223 (Ronald D. Nadler ct a. eds., 1995).
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gression warrants careful consideration, neither overzealously championed nor smugly ignored. We should not let our condemnation of
rape retard the scientific study of the phenomenon. For if the phenomenon of rape is as horrible as we perceive it to be, we should look
for information that is accurate and useful, from whatever source derived. Following these long years of comparative stagnation in our
quest to understand and prevent rape, efforts to integrate the life science perspectives on rape with the social science perspectives on rape
may eventually provide some much needed progress.

